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Stricter competition policy reduces expected payo¤s before and after
innovation, but reduces pre-innovation payo¤s relatively more than post-
innovation payo¤s, and therefore increases the equilibrium level of R&D
activity: tough product-market competition policy stimulates innovation.
There is an inverted-U relationship between competition policy and ex-
pected welfare. The model also permits analysis of the e¤ect of R&D
spillovers and of alternative R&D cooperation regimes on expected welfare,
on R&D e¤orts, and on the expected time to discovery of a cost-saving
innovation.
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The Trouble with Tribbles.
1. Introduction
A large literature examines the impact of R&D cooperation on technological per-
formance.1 In Martin (1996), I show that R&D cooperation makes it more likely
that tacit collusion will be an equilibrium strategy. Here I reverse the direction
of causality and investigate the impact of product-market competition policy on
technological performance.
In a market system, …rms invest in new technology and new product develop-
ment because of the pro…t they expect to earn after discovery and development.
More precisely, a …rm’s incentive to invest in research and development depends
on the di¤erence between the pro…t it earns before innovation and the pro…t it
expects to earn after innovation.2
Competition or antitrust policy exposes …rms to the possibility of …nes and
injunctions if they engage in prohibited conduct.3 But the proscriptions of com-
petition law will not be binding constraints unless the probability that violations
will be detected is su¢ciently high and the penalties that follow conviction are
su¢ciently great. In practice, neither of these conditions is likely to be met, with
the result that the e¤ect of competition policy will be to deter and ameliorate the
condemned behavior, not to completely prevent it.
Thus competition policy typically prohibits naked collusion, which nonetheless
occurs. Colluding …rms may think that with a certain probability, their actions
will not come to light; or if their actions do come to light, that with a certain
probability authorities will not meet the standards of proof laid down by the
courts; or that in contrary states of the world, any …nes eventually imposed are
likely to be small relative to collusive pro…ts.
Pro…t-maximizing …rms will alter their behavior to take expected antitrust
penalties into account. Colluding …rms, for example, may raise price above the
noncooperative equilibrium level of a one-shot game,4 but deliberately hold price
1For contributions and references to this literature, see Suzumura and Goto (1997), Meißner
and Markl (1997), Martin (1997), and Jorde and Teece (1997).
2See the literature that follows from Arrow (1962), in particular Gilbert and Newbery (1982,
1984) and Reinganum (1983).
3In some circumstances, individuals responsible for decisions to infringe competition rules
open themselves up to the possibility of criminal penalties, including imprisonment. Such penal-
ties do occur, but they are exceptional, and are not modelled here.
4Or “a noncooperative equilibrium level of a one-shot game,” if there are multiple equilibria.
3below the joint-pro…t-maximizing level, to reduce the probability of attracting the
attention of enforcement agencies.5
This argument suggests a model of antitrust-enforcement limiting behavior on
the part of …rms, and implies that product-market competition policy will reduce
pro…tability both before and after innovation. This means that product-market
competition policy will a¤ect …rms’ incentives to invest in innovation.
In the model of competition policy that is developed here, stricter competition
policy reduces expected payo¤s before and after innovation, but reduces pre-inno-
vation payo¤s relatively more than post-innovation payo¤s, and therefore increases
the equilibrium level of R&D activity. Tough product-market competition policy
stimulates innovation.
There is, however, an inverted-U relationship between competition policy and
expected welfare. Making competition policy tougher always promotes innova-
tion; it increases welfare up to a certain point, beyond which decreasing returns
set in and welfare begins to decline.
The model also yields insights into the e¤ect of R&D spillovers on expected
welfare, on R&D e¤orts, and on the expected time to discovery of a cost-saving
innovation.
2. Monopoly equilibrium with competition policy
2.1. The market
Write the equation of the inverse demand curve as
p = p(q) + " (2.1)
I assume that expected demand p(q) is downward sloping and otherwise well
behaved.
The error term " has continuous and di¤erentiable density function6 f("), with
mean 0 and variance ¾2.
The density function is de…ned over the range
" · " · "; (2.2)
where
" < 0 < " · 1: (2.3)
5In both Trenton Potteries and the electrical equipment conspiracies of the 1950s, the en-
forcement authorities’ attention was brought to the o¤ending conduct, in the …rst instance, by
customers whose suspicions were aroused by prices that they regarded as excessive.
6For an elaboration of the model with linear inverse demand and a uniform distribution of
", see Martin (1998).
4There is always some range of prices over which demand is positive:
p(0) + " > 0 (2.4)
2.2. Modeling competition policy
Competition authorities have limited resources and imperfect information. Imper-
fect information manifests itself in two ways that are central for the administration
of competition policy.
First, imperfect information a¤ects the competition authority’s decisions about
the allocation of enforcement resources. The competition authority does not di-
rectly observe …rm conduct. It observes the market outcome — here, the realized
price. The realized price is in‡uenced but not completely determined by the …rm’s
actions.7
To model the competition authority’s decision-making process, I suppose that
it sets an industry-speci…c threshold price g. If the realized price rises above g,
the competition authority investigates the industry. Investigation means that the
competition authority devotes some resources to acquiring additional information
about the industry, after which it either decides to prosecute …rms in the industry
for violating the law, or it lets the matter drop.8
It is realistic to suppose that competition authorities have imperfect informa-
tion about …rm conduct, that they monitor industry conditions, and then they
decide whether or not to examine a particular industry in detail based on what
they observe. The speci…cation that the competition authority considers a sin-
gle variable when it makes its investigation decision is used for simplicity — in
practice, a vector of variables would be observed.
The other way in which imperfect information a¤ects the working of competi-
tion policy regards the decision to prosecute and the outcome of such a prosecu-
tion, if it should occur.9 A high realized price may re‡ect a large value of " or it
may re‡ect the exercise of monopoly power. If the competition authority investi-
gates an industry, it might conclude that the high observed price is not due to the
exercise of market power. Alternatively, it might decide that the high observed
7In this sense the competition authority and the …rm stand in a principal-agent relationship,
with the competition authority as principal.
8In this paper, g is treated as a parameter under the control of the competition authority.
Ongoing research examines the competition authority’s problem of setting threshold prices when
it monitors several industries subject to an overall budget constraint.
9Besanko and Spulber (1989) present a model of competition policy with imperfect informa-
tion that has much in common with models of limit pricing: the competition authority knows
that production cost is high or low, but it does not know which. This approach does not allow
for uncertainty about the functioning of the legal system.
5price is due to the legal exercise of market power. Competition policy typically
does not prohibit the exercise of market power as such; what it prohibits is strate-
gic behavior aimed at acquiring or maintaining a position of market power10 that
is thought to infringe the rules of acceptable business behavior in some way. In
either case, a high realized price would trigger an investigation but not result in
any liability for the …rm.
But this is not the only uncertain element of the enforcement process. The
competition authority may institute a legal proceeding against the incumbent,
but it may not prevail. The competition authority may fail because it is found
not to have respected the legal rights of the …rm. It may fail because it is not able
to meet the standards of proof laid down by the letter or interpretation of the
law. It may fail because competition law con‡icts with some other branch of the
law and courts resolve the con‡ict against the application of competition law.11
From the point of view of …rms, all these factors make it uncertain whether
an antitrust …ne would be levied, if a high realized price should trigger an inves-
tigation. To capture all of this uncertainty about the result of an investigation,
I suppose there is a parameter °, which is common knowledge, that is the prob-
ability of investigation, legal challenge, and conviction if price rises above the
enforcement threshold g. If the …rm is found to have o¤ended the provisions
of competition law, it pays a …ne F. The expected …ne in the event that an
investigation is undertaken — if price rises above g — is °F.12
2.3. Competition policy and static monopoly payo¤s
Given the threshold price g and the distribution of ", a monopolist’s instantaneous
expected payo¤ when unit cost is c is




The …rst term on the right is pro…t from the sale of q units of output. The
second is the expected value of antitrust …nes. The lower limit of the integral,
10Under the terminology “monopolization,” “conspiracy to monopolize,” “abuse of a dominant
position,” or “collusion.” Note that collusive outcomes reached through genuinely noncoopera-
tive behavior typically do not violate competition policy.
11For example, it might have been held that U.S. antitrust law applied to OPEC collusion in
the 1970s. In the event, the decision was that foreign policy considerations ruled this out; see
Grossack (1986).
12It would be possible to endogenize °F, by making it a function of the levels of resources
devoted to prosecution and to defense, or of some index of the severity of the o¤ense. But both
° and F are likely to depend in part on the received standards of the legal system, in ways that
the legislature and the competition authority can in‡uence but not completely control. In U.S.
antitrust, the elaboration of the concept of “antitrust injury” is an example. (For evolutionary
views of the development of the common law, see Rubin, 1977 and Priest, 1977.)
6g ¡p(q), is the critical value of the random element of demand, given output and
the implied expected price chosen by the …rm. If the realized value of " exceeds
g ¡ p(q), the observed price exceeds the threshold level and investigation takes
place.
In the second term on the right,




is the probability that the competition authority undertakes an investigation. It
depends on the threshold price g and on output q. A low threshold price indicates
a strict competition policy, a high threshold price represents a lenient competition
policy.
A tougher competition policy (lower g) increases the probability of investiga-
tion, all else equal:
@¿
@g
= ¡f[g ¡ p(q)] < 0: (2.7)
I will assume that there are decreasing returns to lowering the investigation
threshold, in the sense that
@2¿
@g2 = ¡f
0[g ¡ p(q)] > 0: (2.8)
There are positive but decreasing returns to deterring the exercise of monopoly
power.
The …rst-order condition to maximize ¼(c) is13
@¼
@q
= p(q) ¡ c + q
dp
dq




It follows that the pro…t-maximizing …rm selects an output that makes mar-








The …rm expands output above the unconstrained monopoly level to reduce the
probability of an antitrust investigation.










+ (q ¡ °Ff)
d2p
dq2 < 0:
This is satis…ed for linear demand, and is henceforth assumed.
7Now turn to the question of comparative statics with respect to the threshold

























The denominator on the right is negative by the second-order condition for pro…t
maximization. Hence lowering the investigation threshold g induces greater equi-
librium output.14












= °Ff[g ¡ p(q)] > 0 (2.14)
(making use of the envelope theorem). Tougher competition policy (a lower in-
vestigation threshold g) lowers equilibrium pro…t.
2.3.1. Example
Monopoly Consider a market with linear inverse demand curve
p = 110 ¡ Q + " (2.15)
Let marginal cost be constant, 10 per unit, and suppose there are no …xed costs.
If the industry were perfectly competitive, long-run equilibrium price would be
10.









14One can also show that an increase in °F increases equilibrium output.
15A truncated normal distribution would yield similar results, except that such a case would
always have equilibrium g ¡ p > 0. In this sense, the exponential speci…cation implies a weak
competition policy.













This has range (¡10;1) (see Figure 2.1). " has mean 0 and variance ¾2 = 100.
For this density function, it is more likely that " will fall in a range of modestly
negative values than in a higher range of identical length.
Table 3.4 reports the main characteristics of monopoly equilibrium without
competition policy and for threshold prices ranging from 70 to 10. Without com-
petition policy, monopoly pro…t is 2500 per time period. The …gures reported in
Table 2.1 are calculated for °F = 1000. This is 40% of the no-competition policy
payo¤.
Here and in what follows, I measure expected net social welfare as the sum of
expected economic pro…t and expected consumers’ surplus,16 on the ground that
from a normative point of view this is what an impartial competition authority
would maximize.17
16When the discussion moves to innovation, these are measured in terms of expected present
discounted values.
17The expected value of …nes is a transfer from …rms to the competition authority, and thus
not lost to society, enforcement costs must be set against such transfers. Proper consideration of
net enforcement cost requires a model of the behavior of a competition authority that allocates
9g qm pm ¿ ¼m CS ¼m + CS
No cp 50:00 60:00 na 2500:0 1250:0 3750:0
70 54:37 55:63 0:087 2393:5 1478:1 3871:6
65 56:08 53:92 0:122 2341:6 1572:3 3913:9
60 58:15 51:85 0:163 2270:7 1690:5 3961:2
55 60:56 49:45 0:211 2177:5 1833:5 4011:0
50 63:27 46:73 0:265 2058:6 2001:4 4060:0
45 66:24 43:76 0:392 1911:3 2194:1 4105:4
40 69:45 40:56 0:389 1733:0 2411:3 4144:3
35 72:84 37:16 0:457 1521:8 2652:6 4174:4
30 76:39 33:61 0:528 1275:7 2917:7 4193:4
25 80:08 29:92 0:602 993:5 3206:5 4200:0
20 83:89 26:11 0:678 673:7 3518:7 4192:4
15 87:80 22:20 0:756 315:4 3854:2 4169:6
10 91:79 18:21 0:836 ¡82:5 4213:0 4130:5
Table 2.1: Static Monopoly Market Performance, Alternative Investigation
Thresholds
Notes: p = 110 ¡ Q, c = 10, ° = 1=2, F = 2000, ¾ = 10.
g = 70 is a relatively high threshold price, one standard deviation above the
no-competition policy monopoly price. It results in a relatively small probability
of investigation — 8.7% — but also an 8.7% expansion in output and a 3.2%
increase in net social welfare, compared with the no-competition policy case.
As the threshold price falls, output and consumers’ surplus rise and economic
pro…t falls. For high and intermediate values of g (g ¸ 45), the expected price is
below the threshold price. For lower values of g, the expected price is above the
threshold price.
Despite the increase in output, the equilibrium probability of investigation
rises as g falls. When g falls, the comparative static response of the monopolist
is to expand output, but the monopolist does not expand output so much that
the direct e¤ect of a lower threshold price on the probability of investigation is
neutralized or reversed.
Even for low threshold prices, when the equilibrium expected price is above g,
the probability of investigation is less than 1: there is always some chance that a
large negative " will push the realized price below the investigation threshold.
There is an inverted–U relationship between g and net social welfare: beyond
a certain point (g ¼ 25 for this example), further increases in the severity of
scarce enforcement resources across several industries, and is the subject of ongoing research.
10competition policy reduce net social welfare. For threshold prices at low levels,
the reductions in expected pro…t (after allowing for expected …nes) that follow
from further reductions in g more then o¤set further gains in consumers’ surplus.
This is a consequence of the assumption that there are decreasing returns to
lowering the investigation threshold.
Oligopoly Qualitatively similar results obtain for noncooperative oligopoly. Ta-
ble 2.2 gives numerical results for the market of the monopoly example when there
are two quantity-setting …rms and each …rm noncooperatively maximizes its own
expected payo¤,







The …nal term on the right implies that if there is a successful prosecution, each
…rm expects to pay one-half of the resulting …ne.18 This speci…cation is appro-
priate for joint o¤enses against competition policy, such as tacit collusion or joint
strategic entry deterrence. It would not be appropriate for single-…rm violations
of competition policy, such as (for example) abuse of a dominant position.
As in Table 2.1, output, the probability of investigation, and consumers’ sur-
plus all rise as competition policy becomes stricter — as g falls. Economic pro…t
falls as g falls. Once again, there is an inverted-U relation between g and net social
welfare. A moderately strict competition policy improves net social welfare.
The size of the impact of competition policy on market performance is less
for duopoly than for monopoly (without competition policy, expected net social
welfare is 4444.4; maximum expected net social welfare with competition policy
is approximately 4449.9, for g ¼ 55). This is a consequence of the improvement
in market performance when there are two …rms rather than one.
18Anticipating situations in which …rms have di¤erent unit costs and therefore di¤erent equi-
librium market shares, one might wish to investigate a model in which a …rm expects to pay a
fraction of the expected …ne equal to its market share. Such a speci…cation would complicate
…rst-order conditions, compared with equation (2.17); it would not change equilibrium total
output, and is not examined here.
11g qN pN ¿ ¼N CS 2¼N + CS
No CP 33:33 43:33 na 1111:1 2222:2 4444:4
70 33:73 42:55 0:024 1085:9 2275:0 4446:8
65 33:95 42:09 0:037 1071:0 2305:7 4447:8
60 34:29 41:42 0:057 1048:7 2351:6 4449:0
55 34:77 40:47 0:086 1016:2 2417:5 4449:9
50 35:41 39:18 0:125 970:9 2507:9 4449:7
45 36:24 37:53 0:174 910:5 2626:9 4446:9
40 37:25 35:51 0:235 832:8 2774:5 4439:9
35 38:43 33:15 0:306 736:6 2953:3 4426:5
30 39:76 30:47 0:386 621:2 3162:2 4404:7
25 41:23 27:53 0:474 486:0 3400:3 4372:3
20 42:82 24:36 0:569 330:5 3666:8 4327:7
15 44:50 21:00 0:670 154:3 3960:1 4269:5
10 46:27 17:46 0:776 ¡42:7 4281:5 4196:1
Table 2.2: Static Duopoly Market Performance, Alternative Investigation Thresh-
olds
Note: parameters as for Table 2.1.
3. Competition Policy and Innovation
3.1. Monopoly
3.1.1. Racing for cost-saving innovation
I will use a standard racing model of cost-saving innovation.19 Initially the monop-
olist produces with unit cost c1. By setting up a research project, it can develop
a more e¢cient technology, reducing unit cost to c2 per unit. If it does set up
such a research project, the time at which the new technology comes on line is a
random variable. The random discovery time I has a Poisson distribution,
Pr(I · t) = 1 ¡ e
¡ht; (3.1)
where h is the level or intensity of the R&D project.





19Because the basic model is well known, I give it an abbreviated treatment. For further
discussion, see Reinganum (1989) or the Appendix to Martin (1997).
12A greater level of R&D activity therefore brings forward the expected time of
discovery.
A greater level of R&D activity is also more costly: the R&D cost function is
z(h), with positive and increasing marginal cost of R&D e¤ort:
z
0(h) > 0 z
00(h) > 0: (3.3)


















¼m(c1;g) = instantaneous pre-innovation payo¤
¼m(c2;g) = instantaneous post-innovation payo¤ ; (3.5)
and c2 < c1 implies that the payo¤ is greater after innovation:
¼m(c2;g) > ¼m(c1;g): (3.6)















(r + h)2 (3.7)
=
¼m(c2;g) ¡ ¼m(c1;g) + z(h) ¡ (r + h)z0(h)
(r + h)2 = 0: (3.8)
3.1.2. Comparative statics with respect to g










In view (3.3), the comparative static derivative has the same sign as the deriv-

















g ¡ pm(c1) g ¡ pm(c2)
f[g ¡ pm(c1)]
f[g ¡ pm(c2)]
Figure 3.1: Equilibrium g ¡ p(ci)















and recall from (2.14) d¼m=dg > 0.
If condition (3.11) holds, then innovation, which reduces unit cost, reduces the
impact of a reduction in g on the …rm’s pro…t.21 In other words, if (3.11) holds,
one incentive for the …rm to innovate is to shield itself from the threat of antitrust
…nes.
Using (2.14) to evaluate (3.10),
@[¼m(c2;g) ¡ ¼m(c1;g)]
@g
= °F ff[g ¡ pm(c2)] ¡ f[g ¡ pm(c1)]g (3.13)
21The analogy with strategic substitutability is clear. Note that (1) Bulow et al (1985)
normalize variables so that greater values indicate more aggressive play, while here lower values
of g indicate more aggressive monitoring by the competition authority and lower values of c
imply greater output; and (2) c is not a choice variable of the …rm.
14(3.13) is negative, as shown in Figure 3.1. The lower cost that follows successful
innovation implies a lower monopoly price, leading to
0 < pm(c2) < pm(c1) (3.14)
g ¡ pm(c2) > g ¡ pm(c1) (3.15)





This gives the …rst result of the model:
Theorem 1: Stricter product-market competition policy increases monopoly equi-
librium R&D intensity.
A tougher competition policy compresses the incumbent’s pre- and post-in-
novation payo¤s. But it compresses the incumbent’s pre-innovation payo¤ more
than the incumbent’s post-innovation payo¤, resulting in greater R&D e¤ort and
(in view of (3.2)), a shorter expected time to discovery.
Figure 3.2 illustrates this result for the linear demand example underlying
Table 2.1 and the demand uncertainty density shown in Figure 2.1. The innova-
tion is moderate: unit cost after production is 5 rather than 10; the interest rate
is 10%. The R&D cost function is quadratic,
z(h) = uh + vh
2; (3.18)
for u = 10, v = 1000.
The curve labeled “M” shows the investigation threshold-expected time-to-
discovery relationship. Expected time to discovery is 2.4 time periods without
competition policy, 2.3 if g = 70, and falls steadily to 1.7 for g = 10.
The negative relationship between g and expected discovery time translates
into an inverted-U relationship between g and expected present-discounted net
social welfare, as shown in Figure 3.3.
Net social welfare is 40,158 without competition policy, 41,402 for g = 70. Net
social welfare rises to 45,428 for g = 20, then falls to 45,113 for g = 10.22
22If g = 10, the …rm’s instantaneous payo¤ is negative when marginal cost is 10, positive when
marginal cost is 5, and the …rm’s expected present-discounted value is 2,596.8. This compares
with an expected present discounted value of 26,723 without competition policy.
15E(Disc)
g
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n = 2, a = 110, c1 = 10, c2 = 5, ¾ = 10, u = 10, v = 1000, ¸ = 1
Figure 3.2: Expected time to discovery, Monopoly and Alternative Duopoly Co-
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n = 2, a = 110, c1 = 10, c2 = 5, ¾ = 10, u = 10, v = 1000, ¸ = 1; N indicates
noncooperative R&D, OE indicates an operating entity joint venture, S indicates
a secretariat R&D joint venture
Figure 3.3: Net social welfare, Alternative R&D Regimes, s = 1=3
173.2. Duopoly
I wish to compare duopoly and oligopoly market performance, allowing for R&D
spillovers and for the possibility of alternative R&D cooperation arrangements.
3.2.1. Spillovers
Each …rm picks its own R&D intensity hi, interpreted as above. Spillovers in‡u-
ence the …rm’s e¤ective R&D intensity, ¹i,
¹i = hi + shj; (3.19)
for i, j = 1;2 and i 6= j. The spillover parameter s lies between zero and one.
Zero indicates the absence of spillovers, one indicates that a …rm’s R&D activity
bene…ts its rival as much as itself.
The probability that a …rm completes its R&D project at or before time t
depends on e¤ective R&D intensity; the distribution of random discovery time is
then
Pr(Ii · t) = 1 ¡ exp(¡¹it): (3.20)
Spillovers reduce a …rm’s incentive to spend on R&D, since some of the research
e¤ort it pays for bene…ts its rival. However, spillovers increase the e¤ectiveness
of such R&D spending as does take place, since a portion of each …rm’s spending
increases the likelihood of discovery of all …rms.
3.2.2. Noncooperative R&D
If the two …rms carry out independent R&D projects, the …rst …rm to develop the
cost-saving process receives an e¤ective patent. In calculating the winning …rm’s
post-innovation payo¤, I assume that it licenses use of the new technology to the
losing …rm for a fee c1 ¡ c2 per unit of output.23
Let ¼W denote the static payo¤ of the …rm that wins the innovation race, ¼L
the static payo¤ of the loser. ¼N(ci) is the static noncooperative Cournot duopoly
payo¤ if both …rms operate with unit cost ci.24
23I use this speci…cation for its simplicity, not for its realism. It is possible to generalize the
model to allow for imperfect post-innovation appropriability. While there is good reason to
think that patents do not ensure absolute appropriability, there is also evidence that in many
sectors there are other appropriability devices that are e¤ective (Levin et al., 1987).
24For notational simplicity, the functional dependence of payo¤s on g is not explicitly noted.
18For noncooperative R&D, …rm i picks its R&D intensity hi to maximize its




¼N(c1) ¡ z(hi) +
¹i¼W+¹j¼L
r
r + ¹1 + ¹2
=
¼N(c1) ¡ z(hi) +
(¼W+s¼L)hi+(s¼W+¼L)hj
r
r + (1 + s)(h1 + h2)
(3.21)
(for j 6= i).
3.2.3. Operating Entity Joint Venture
If the two …rms form an operating entity joint venture,25 they carry out one R&D
project and evenly share the cost. The R&D intensity h of the project is chosen











This assumes that there is noncooperative product-market rivalry before and
after innovation.
3.2.4. Secretariat Joint Venture
With a secretariat joint venture, each …rm carries out its own R&D project. Re-
sults are shared; when discovery takes place, both …rms have access to the new




¼N(c1) ¡ z(hi) + (¹1 + ¹2)
¼N(c2)
r
r + ¹1 + ¹2
=
¼N(c1) ¡ z(hi) + (1 + s)(h1 + h2)
¼N(c2)
r
r + (1 + s)(h1 + h2)
(3.23)
(for i = 1;2).
3.2.5. Results
Theorem 2, which is proven in the Appendix, outlines the competition policy-R&D
intensity relationship for the alternative R&D regimes.
























25Vornortas (1994) attributes the terminology “operating entity joint venture” and “secre-
tariat joint venture” to Ouchi (1989).
19for





































Part (a) shows that for linear demand, stricter competition policy increases
noncooperative equilibrium R&D intensity. For parts (b) and (c), a condition
analogous to (3.11) is su¢cient for stricter competition policy to increase equi-
librium R&D intensity. As in the monopoly case, if cost reduction reduces the
marginal impact of competition policy on the payo¤s, then stricter competition
policy increases R&D intensity.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the investigation threshold-expected discovery relation-
ship for linear demand and exponential distribution of ". The spillover rate is
1/3, which is relevant for noncooperative (N) and secretariat (S) R&D.26 Under
all three oligopoly regimes, stricter competition policy shortens the expected time
to discovery. Noncooperative R&D, with multiple research paths and high R&D
levels, induced by the lure of high payo¤s from …rst success and the threat of low
payo¤s otherwise, brings by far the shortest expected discovery time. Expected
discovery time with noncooperative R&D does fall as the threshold price g falls,
but the magnitude of the impact is slight. With either type of cooperative R&D,
R&D levels are much lower, and expected time to discovery is much longer than
with noncooperative R&D (and comparable to expected discovery time under
monopoly).
The alternative cooperation regimes rank quite di¤erently in terms of expected
net social welfare (Figure 3.3). Of the three cooperation regimes, secretariat
R&D yields the greatest welfare, independent R&D the least. Secretariat R&D
dominates operating entity R&D because two research projects translate into
26The spillover rate does not a¤ect the outcome for an operating entity joint venture, since
with this form of R&D cooperation there is just one research project.
20E(Disc)
g







7 M r r r r r r r r r r r r r
N;s = 0
r r r r r r r r r r r r r N;s = 1=3 r r r r r r r r r r r r r
N;s = 2=3 r r r r r r r r r r r r r
n = 2, a = 110, c1 = 10, c2 = 5, ¾ = 10, u = 10, v = 1000, ¸ = 1
Figure 3.4: Expected time to discovery, Noncooperative R&D, Alternative
Spillover Levels
two independent possibilities of bringing the innovation on line. Secretariat and
operating entity R&D both dominate noncooperative R&D because they imply
that both …rms have access to the new technology after discovery.
All three duopoly cooperation regimes yield greater expected net social welfare
than monopoly. For the most part, this re‡ects better static market performance
under duopoly; expected discovery times under monopoly and cooperative R&D
are comparable.
For noncooperative R&D, increases in spillovers increase the expected time to
discovery (Figure 3.4), although the magnitude of the e¤ect is slight. Increases in
spillovers also increase expected net social welfare (Figure 3.5). Greater spillover
levels reduce the single …rm’s incentive to spend on R&D, since they make it more
likely that the …rm’s R&D will lead the other …rm to discovery …rst. But this also
means that such R&D as does take place is more e¤ective, increasing welfare.
Whether secretariat R&D or operating entity R&D yields a shorter expected
time to discovery depends on the level of spillovers (Figure 3.6). For low spillover
levels, expected discovery time is less with an operating entity R&D. As spillover
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n = 2, a = 110, c1 = 10, c2 = 5, ¾ = 10, u = 10, v = 1000, ¸ = 1; N indicates
noncooperative R&D, OE indicates an operating entity joint venture, S indicates
a secretariat R&D joint venture
Figure 3.5: Net social welfare, Noncooperative R&D, Alternative Spillover Levels
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Figure 3.6: Expected time to discovery, Cooperative R&D Regimes, Alternative
Spillover Rates
yond a critical level falls below that of operating entity R&D. With secretariat
R&D, greater spillovers improve technological performance. This contrasts with
noncooperative R&D (Figure 3.4). The di¤erence between the two regimes is that
with a secretariat joint venture, all …rms have equal access to the new technology
after innovation.
Secretariat R&D consistently yields greater expected net social welfare than
operating entity R&D (Figure 3.7). The welfare level with secretariat R&D rises
with the level of spillovers, as for noncooperative R&D.
4. Conclusion
Competition policy reduces expected …rm pro…ts by exposing …rms to the pos-
sibility of …nes if they engage in privately pro…table but socially disapproved-of
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n = 2, a = 110, c1 = 10, c2 = 5, ¾ = 10, u = 10, v = 1000, ¸ = 1; N indicates
noncooperative R&D, OE indicates an operating entity joint venture, S indicates
a secretariat R&D joint venture
Figure 3.7: Net social welfare, Cooperative R&D Regimes, Alternative spillover
levels
24formance, pro…t-maximizing …rms will expand output, simultaneously reducing
the probability of investigation and improving static market performance. They
will also increase R&D e¤orts, reducing the expected time to development of
lower-cost production methods (which will also lower the probability of antitrust
prosecution).
There is an inverted-U relationship between competition policy and expected
net social welfare. A moderately strict competition policy improves welfare; ex-
cessively strict competition policy does not.
Spillovers lower the expected time to discovery for secretariat R&D and in-
crease it for noncooperative R&D. Spillovers improve net social welfare under
both regimes. In the examples considered here, the shortest time to discovery
occurs for noncooperative R&D and zero spillovers. The greatest expected social
welfare occurs for secretariat R&D and high spillover levels. If society wishes
to promote technological progress as a goal in and of itself, the recipe suggested
by the model developed here is independent R&D with an e¤ective appropriabil-
ity mechanism.27 If society wishes to promote expected net social welfare, the
recipe is secretariat R&D with spillovers and moderately tough competition pol-
icy, which brings multiple R&D paths, di¤usion of results, and improved static
market performance.
5. Appendix: proof of Theorem 2
Parts (b) and (c) are immediate from di¤erentiation of the respective …rst-order
conditions.
5.1. dh=dg
Firm 1’s expected present-discounted value is
V1 =
¼N ¡ z(h1) + 1
r[(¼W + s¼L)h1 + (s¼W + ¼L)h2]
r + (1 + s)(h1 + h2)
(5.1)
The …rst-order condition to maximize V1 is










27Broadly de…ned, long-lived patents, for example (although it is not clear that there is in
fact much government can do to enhance e¤ective appropriability).






r + (1 + s)(h1 + h2)
: (5.3)
The assumption that z00(h1) > 0 is su¢cient to ensure that the …rst-order condi-
tion identi…es a maximum.
Di¤erentiate the …rst-order condition with respect to h1 to obtain an expression










1+s + h1 + h2
(5.4)
Stability requires that this be less than one in absolute value in the neighbor-
hood of equilibrium. Setting h1 = h2 = h, this implies










00(h) < 0: (5.5)
This will henceforth be assumed.28
Now set h1 = h2 = h in (5.2) to obtain the equation that determines nonco-
operative equilibrium R&D intensity:











00(h) = 0 (5.6)























In view of (5.5), dh=dg and the term in braces on the right in (5.7) have the










28Stability conditions were satis…ed for the simulations reported in the text.
265.2. Comparative statics, post-innovation market
First evaluate (5.10). I assume that demand is linear. Payo¤s are















Q = qW + qL (5.13)
is noncooperative equilibrium output in the post-innovation market.
The …rst-order conditions for pro…t maximization are
@¼W
@qW





0 = 0 (5.14)
@¼L
@qL





0 = 0 (5.15)













p0 > 0 (5.17)
respectively.

































(5.14) makes the …rst term on the right in (5.18) equal to zero; (5.15) makes
the second term on the right in (5.19) equal to zero; this is the envelope theorem.














































+ c1 ¡ c2
= ¡(p ¡ c1)
(using (5.16)).








0 = ¡(p ¡ c1) (5.23)
(using (5.17)).
Substitute (5.22) and (5.23) into (5.21) to obtain
d(¼W ¡ ¼L)
dg









Now subtract (5.15) from (5.14) and rearrange terms to obtain
qW ¡ qL = ¡
c1 ¡ c2









and (5.10) is satis…ed.
285.3. Comparative statics, pre-innovation market
Now turn to consideration of (5.8) and (5.9).
If both …rms operate with unit cost c1, …rm 1’s payo¤ is







Equilibrium per-…rm output qN satis…es the condensed …rst-order condition















p0 > 0: (5.30)














The indicated sign depends on f0(g ¡ p) < 0, which is henceforth assumed.
Firm 1’s equilibrium payo¤ is



















To evaluate d¼N=dqN, di¤erentiate (5.32) with respect to qN:
d¼N
dqN











0 = ¡[p(2qN) ¡ c1] (5.34)





























°Ff[g ¡ p(2qN)] (5.37)
Since
Q > 2qN (5.38)
p(Q) < p(2qN) (5.39)
g ¡ p(Q) > g ¡ p(2qN) (5.40)

























= ¡[p(Q) ¡ c1]
dqL
dg










Assume that f0 < 0, f00 > 0 over the range of " that is relevant for the pre-
and post-innovation equilibria. This is a regularity condition on the distribution
of the random part of demand.
Then
f
0[g ¡ p(2qN)] < f
0[g ¡ p(Q)] < 0 (5.45)
(see Figure 5.1);
°Ff
0[g ¡ p(2qN)] < °Ff











g ¡ p(2qN) g ¡ p(Q)






































Combined with (5.43), this establishes that (5.8) is satis…ed.
Essentially the same arguments, with appropriate sign changes, show that
(5.9) is satis…ed. This establishes part (a) of Theorem 2.
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